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Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic future is increasingly uncertain as the Georgian Dream party, seeking a fourth consecutive term in government, has aligned itself with the Russian Federation and demonstrated authoritarian inclinations. The October 26 parliamentary elections are a watershed moment. They offer the promise of a reset with the West or the peril of an even more decisive rupture with Georgia’s Western partners, accelerating the slide towards authoritarianism. The country deserves the attention of Western policymakers at this critical moment as the election will have a decisive impact on the West’s influence in the region.
Orbanism in the South Caucasus
In its authoritarianism and pro-Russian approach, Georgian Dream resembles nothing so much as Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz Party in Hungary. Indeed, the two governments have maintained a robust relationship in recent years and Budapest is seen as a key advocate for advancing Tbilisi’s EU candidacy within the bloc. This reality neatly encapsulates the challenge for Georgia’s EU prospects. Orbán’s Hungary is already a massive headache for policymakers in Brussels, who are understandably reluctant to add another Orbán to the bloc. One government that goes out of its way to undermine critical EU foreign policy initiatives, especially on Ukraine, and does everything in its power to resist deepening EU integration is quite enough.
Most European Union countries, and some in the South Caucasus, have scaled back their relations with the Russian Federation in the aftermath of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Georgia has gone in the opposite direction. Tbilisi has declined to join Western economic sanctions against Russia and there are indications that the country is a conduit for sanctions evasion. Rhetorically, the government has aligned itself with Moscow with its muted criticism of the invasion, instead blaming the outbreak of the war on NATO expansion. High-ranking officials within Georgian Dream and party-allied media outlets have also advanced a conspiracy theory about a “Global War Party” that includes the Georgian opposition and a shadowy cabal that controls Western governments, media, and financial institutions and is trying to get Georgia to open a second front in the Caucasus. This anti-Western rhetoric, coupled with practical steps to align with Russia, is an important directional signal of the government’s position vis-à-vis Moscow and the West.
While the Georgian government’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has not increased Tbilisi’s popularity in Brussels or Washington, it is the growing authoritarianism of the Georgian Dream government that has most deeply damaged relations with the West. Democratic backsliding and troubles with the rule of law have been flashpoints for some time. Many of the European Union’s “12 Priorities,” issues which are deemed the biggest obstacles to Georgian EU candidacy status, focused on reversing authoritarian governance, strengthening the courts, and protecting civil society. The government did adopt some reforms, including strengthening anti-corruption bodies and adopting European Court of Human Rights rulings into the Georgian legal code. The government made less progress on issues of democratic competition. Nonetheless, the European Commission decided that the enacted reforms were sufficient for Georgia to receive candidate status in November 2023.
This status did not last very long. Tbilisi saw its candidate status suspended due to the foreign agent law, passed in May 2024––dubbed the “Russian Law” by the opposition. This law, eerily similar in form and intent to a Russian law passed in 2012, mandates civil society organizations that receive over 20 percent of their funding from foreign sources to register as “foreign agents” and submit to onerous reporting requirements. The law attempts to reduce the influence of Georgia’s large, vibrant, and generally pro-Western civil society. It is also the most nakedly authoritarian action the Georgian government has taken. The violence and harassment directed against protestors and opposition figures during its passage further diminished Georgia’s democratic credentials. One illustrative example is the case of Gela Khasaia, an opposition activist who was assaulted by police during the protests and subsequently heavily fined for disobeying police commands. Doubling down on repressive measures, the courts made it impossible for him to pay his fine and then used his nonpayment as an excuse to freeze his bank accounts.
Georgian Dream’s rhetoric around the October 26 elections has further strained relations with the West. The party promised to ban most opposition parties for complicity in alleged crimes committed during their tenure in power. These claims range from accusations of corruption and the weaponization of the justice system to accusations of treason over what is presented as the previous government’s deliberate provocation of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Georgian Dream Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze’s assertion that there would be nothing undemocratic about banning the opposition from parliament after the election and having only one party represented in Parliament is particularly brazen. Unsurprisingly, these remarks have drawn condemnation from both Brussels and Washington. Georgian Dream has decried this criticism as election interference. The party has however remained silent about Russian expressions of support for the government.
A Return to the Euro-Atlantic Path?
Georgia’s October 26 Parliamentary elections are hotly contested and could dramatically change Georgia’s path. One important thing to know in the lead-up to this election is that it is not the first intense political crisis Georgia has faced. Opposition allegations of fraud in the 2020 parliamentary elections led to a crisis resolved with an EU-brokered deal that transformed Georgia’s election system into a fully proportional structure. This change has allowed an increase in the diversity of the opposition landscape. This electoral change is good for the opposition because it weakens the monopoly of the highly unpopular United National Movement (UNM), which governed the country from 2003 to 2012, on electoral opposition to Georgian Dream.
The three other major opposition alliances are For Georgia, Strong Georgia, and Coalition for Change. These parties are more divided by personality than ideology and have signed the Georgian Charter, an attempt by Georgia’s staunchly pro-European President Salome Zourabichvili to unite the opposition behind a platform of returning Georgia to its Euro-Atlantic trajectory. Georgian Dream has been especially vicious in its attacks on For Georgia and Strong Georgia as the election enters its final stretch. Neither party was involved in the previous UNM government and so do not have the same electoral baggage resulting from that government’s abuses.
An opposition victory is the most straightforward path toward restoring Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic trajectory and rebuilding its democratic pluralism. Of course, putting together such a government from Georgia’s fractious opposition would be anything but straightforward since Georgia has little history of coalition government. Conversely, a Georgian Dream victory, especially one that is either abetted or followed by further authoritarian consolidation, could prove disastrous for Georgia’s chances of achieving Euro-Atlantic integration. It is hard to see how EU integration can move forward without the repeal of the foreign agent law and doubly hard to envision a scenario where Georgian Dream willingly repeals the law after overcoming so much domestic and international resistance to implement it. If Georgian Dream does move forward with banning pro-Western opposition parties, relations with the West would almost certainly deteriorate and Tbilisi would likely find itself subjected to various economic sanctions. Faced with rejection from the West, Georgia is likely to expand partnerships with Russia and China. This would broaden the influence of the primary authoritarian rivals of the United States in an increasingly important region for global commerce. Such a dramatic shift could lay the groundwork for a second Rose Revolution, a prospect much discussed by both Western media and the Georgia Dream government, which frequently fulminates about phantom Western-backed coup attempts. However, this remains an unlikely outcome due to the strong possibility that the Georgian Dream government either cedes power in the event of a loss or retains enough support among Georgians to win a mostly legitimate victory.
Georgia stands at a critical juncture in its Euro-Atlantic journey. Policymakers in the United States and European Union must be ready to quickly re-engage to help facilitate the formation of a stable government should the Georgian electorate choose pro-Western parties at the polls. They also must be prepared to respond to a potential political crisis should the election outcome prove indecisive or Georgian Dream emerge victorious through illiberal means. As previously mentioned, the 2020 parliamentary elections resulted in a political crisis due to the opposition party’s allegations of fraud, and the level of polarization in the country has only increased in the past four years. Western policymakers cannot afford to take their eyes off Georgia at this critical juncture as doing so may well consign one of the most pro-Western populations in the region to rule by a pro-Russian authoritarian government. While Tbilisi’s Western partners have a role in protecting Georgian democracy and helping the country realize its Euro-Atlantic potential, the path that Georgia chooses is up to the Georgian people.
Views expressed are the author’s own.
